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NO FAULT COMPENSATION
FOR MEDICAL INJURIES
Josephine Y King*
INTRODUCTION
A nation that implements a reasonably adequate health insurance pro-
gram spares its citizens some of the anxiety and deprivation accompanying
the incidence of injury, disease, or other illness. With accessible, publicly
supported health care, persons suffering such disabilities would not be con-
cerned about proof of misconduct on the part of any actor as a prerequisite
to economic recovery. Nonetheless, the question of misconduct or fault
must be dealt with somewhere in the legal system, particularly if it rises
above the level of ordinary negligence. These issues can be more effectively
approached by licensing authorities, formulating standards of treatment, in-
telligently and courageously enforcing professional standards, and ultimately
by application of the criminal law. In focusing on the victim's disability, this
Essay urges a separation of the compensation goal from the putative deter-
rent function of tort law.'
While the system of vindicating wrongs through tort litigation has histori-
cally served either as a substitute for or as an adjunct of more rigorous crimi-
nal penalties, the development of third party insurance, and the possibility or
requirement of purchasing protection through indemnification has stunted,
blunted, or obliterated a fear of personal liability on the part of the
tortfeasor. Furthermore, if the disability is the result of an act of a manufac-
turer or other corporation or government, the cost of any judgment is passed
on to the public through increased prices or taxes.
Although law students are taught that a judgment for the plaintiff in a tort
action serves as compensation for the injury suffered by the victim and as an
incentive to the tortfeasor to conform his conduct to the standards of the
law, the reality is that a tort judgment accomplishes neither objective ade-
* Professor of Law, Director, Center for Health Law and Policy Studies, Pace Law
School. This Article is based on a paper delivered before the Ninth World Congress of Medi-
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1. See generally David S. Starr, The No-Fault Alternative to Medical Malpractice Litiga-
tion: Compensation, Deterrence, and Viability Aspects of a Patient Compensation Scheme, 20
TEX. TECH L. REV. 803 (1989) (suggesting that the tort system is inadequate to compensate
the injured patient).
228 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 8:227
quately, if at all. In fact, many claims of injury based on tortious conduct-
defendant's violation of a duty owed to the plaintiff-either never reach the
courts2 or, if litigated successfully, result in a recovery which is not ration-
ally related to the nature and scope of the wrong.' The latter proposition
operates in both directions. Some victims are paid far more than the eco-
nomic cost of their injury, usually by settling with insurers who are uncer-
tain of the outcome of litigation or estimate the cost of defending the insured
as exceeding the payoff of a nuisance claim by a moderate sum. Thus, even
though that claim has little or no merit, an insurer may offer a settlement
with the victim. In other cases, a few victims of injury, whether in the hospi-
tal or on the highway, obtain very substantial sums based not only on the
nature and severity of the illness but also, and perhaps even more so, upon
appeal to the sympathy of the jury and display of histrionic talents on the
part of counsel.4
Advocating a no fault approach to personal injury is not new in the
United States, as exemplified by a universal acceptance of a strict liability
scheme of workers' compensation. Nevertheless, the movement in the late
1960s and 1970s for no fault reparations for motor vehicle accidents aroused
fierce opposition from American negligence lawyers and, initially, the insur-
ance industry.' The insurance industry soon succumbed, however, realizing
that Congress might legislate in the field and impose federal regulation. Be-
cause the insurance industry preferred to continue its symbiotic relationship
with state insurance departments, it suggested various limited state-based no
fault plans.6 After more than a decade of politics and proposals, approxi-
mately one-half of the states have implemented some form of first party no
fault coverage for injuries due to vehicle accidents.7
2. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LrrIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW
YORK, chs 7, 10 (1990).
3. For data and commentary on the operation of the tort system in vehicle accident
personal injury cases, see NEW YORK INS. DEP'T, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE... FOR WHOSE
BENEFIT? (1970); ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAY-
MENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION (1964); ROBERT E. KEETON &
JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965). See also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, BEYOND MALPRACTICE: COMPENSATION FOR MEDICAL
INJURIES 12-13 (1978); DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF
THE SECY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 101 (1973), DHEW Pub. No. (05) 73-88.
4. JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN 8 (1979).
5. See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 133-34; Josephine Y. King, Accident
Reparation: Reappraisal and Reform, 3 CONN. L. REV. 268, 293 nn.143, 144 (1970-71).
6. See Josephine Y. King, The Insurance Industry and Compensation Plans, 43 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1137, 1152-1164 (1968) (presenting five different proposals by the industry in 1968).
7. JOSEPHINE Y. KING, No FAULT AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT LAW §§ 2.1-2.32 (1987).
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VARIATIONS OF No FAULT
No fault is not a monolithic concept. In its purest form, which could be
designated type A, no fault is a first party insurance system which compen-
sates only for net economic loss. Specifically, net economic loss includes
medical and rehabilitative expenses, wage loss, and substitute services un-
compensated from any other source. Therefore, collateral payments such as
health, accident, and employers' sick leave compensation would be primary.
However, no provision for pain and suffering reparations exists. Through
the first party insurance mechanism, the insured looks to his or her own
insurer to recover out-of-pocket loss, regardless of who was at fault in caus-
ing the injury. The insured files a claim against his or her insurer; only when
there is a controversy over coverage or the amount of payment which cannot
be settled by negotiation or arbitration will the matter reach the courts.
In the United States, no fault automobile compensation is a variation of
type A, although it falls notably short of conforming to the pure scheme
since states permit tort actions for noneconomic loss if a very serious injury
has occurred and the victim can prove fault.' In the absence of serious in-
jury, economic loss is covered up to a specified amount regardless of fault.
A type B scheme, which is surfacing in malpractice reform, is a third
party insurance system which requires health care providers to purchase in-
surance to indemnify them for recoveries awarded to injured patients.9 No
fault entitles patients to recover if they can show the requisite injury and
causation. However, proof of negligence on the part of the health care pro-
vider is not a condition precedent to recovery. Type B plans generally allow
recovery for some noneconomic loss. The right to judicial review in cases of
serious injuries with provable fault is not clearly delineated. Nonetheless, it
would be difficult to justify a compensation system which would refuse to
allow litigation in a case involving the intentional commission of an injurious
act.
A variable which might appear in either type A or type B depends on
whether purchase of the first party or the third party insurance is compul-
sory. Permitting participation on a voluntary basis weakens the system,
reveals doubts in the feasibility of no fault, or simply reflects a political com-
promise to pursue an incremental rather than a total commitment to radical
change.
8. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101-.3179 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991);
N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 5101-5108 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
9. For a description of various statutory schemes for insuring health care providers, see
Ronald S. Latz, No-Fault Liability and Medical Malpractice: A Viability Analysis, 10 J. LEGAL
MED. 479, 493-97 (1989).
1992]
230 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 8:227
MEDICAL ADVERSITY INSURANCE AND DESIGNATED
COMPENSABLE EVENTS
Professor Clark Havighurst and Dr. Lawrence Tancredi advanced a chal-
lenging and complex compensation scheme in the early 1970s. " This type B
no fault scheme, which is similar to workers' compensation, requires institu-
tional and individual health care providers to purchase "medical adversity
insurance" covering their patients."' A patient experiencing injury as a re-
sult of a "compensable event" would be entitled to indemnification for medi-
cal and hospital bills and lost wages up to a specified maximum.
Compensation is not strictly confined to pure economic loss, however, since
the authors permit inclusion of payments for pain and suffering if such suf-
fering is long lasting or closely associated with the medical procedure. 12
The plan requires that health care providers pay premiums based on their
experience rating, which evaluates physicians and hospitals according to
their prior malpractice claims. 3 It is suggested that this experience rating
improves the quality of care by operating as an incentive to avoid adverse
outcomes in malpractice litigation. Furthermore, the plan dictates that
providers would be personally liable if they are aware that a patient has a
claim, but fail to inform that patient.
The critical element in this alternative to the tort litigation system is the
identification of "compensable events" which would allow indemnification
for economic loss. The principal criterion determining which outcomes of
medical intervention merit compensation without a finding of negligence is
relative avoidability."4 In satisfying this standard, it must be determined
how frequently an adverse outcome occurs due to unavoidable consequences
of treating the patient's condition and whether it is unexpected or preventa-
ble. Some compensable events include postoperative infections, allergic re-
actions to drugs, hospital accidents, and foreign objects left in the body. A
second criterion in identifying compensable events is the effect that selecting
a particular treatment with potential adverse effects will have on efforts to
avoid the ultimate adverse result.'" The purpose is improvement in the qual-
ity of care. Another consideration is determining who the appropriate risk
10. For an analysis of this no fault compensation scheme, see Clark C. Havighurst, "Med-
icalAdversity Insurance"-Has Its Time Come?, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1233; Clark C. Havighurst &
Lawrence R. Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance": A No-Fault Approach to Medical Mal-
practice and Quality Assurance, 613 INs. L.J. 69 (1974); Lawrence R. Tancredi, Designing a
No-Fault Alternative, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277 (1986).
11. Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 10, at 71.
12. Id. at 72.
13. Id. at 72-73.
14. Id. at 77-79.
15. Id. at 79-83.
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bearer is, specifically who should bear the costs of the injury.16
A system which provides compensation for the sequelae of iatrogenic in-
jury must demonstrate medical intervention, most often an affirmative act
but also including omitted acts resulting in injury. A causal link must exist
between the medical intervention and the adverse outcome. Since alleviating
the effects of the patient's disability is the primary goal, this compensable
events approach does not demand proof of medical misconduct. Instead,
negligent or willful departure from the appropriate professional standard of
care must be dealt with elsewhere. The system would operate more econom-
ically if adverse outcomes of minimal economic consequence, such as minor
disability resulting in negligible medical expenses and wage loss were ex-
cluded as a threshold matter.
O'CONNELL PROPOSALS
A system that adopts the proposal of Professor Jeffrey O'Connell would
enable professionals, manufacturers, and corporations to elect to indemnify
those they injure.1 7 The scheme requires the enactment of a statute allowing
a defendant to foreclose a claim by promising within a fixed period of time to
pay the plaintiff periodically for economic loss. Such payments would cover
medical expenses, net wage loss, and reasonable attorney's fees.1 8 The stat-
ute may also provide a cap on the average weekly or monthly income loss
payments. Furthermore, the claimant would be disqualified from seeking a
recovery in tort.
Professor O'Connell offers an additional recommendation that does not
require the enactment of a statute. Under a "Neo-No Fault" system, a pro-
vider of services or products often would be obligated to pay a victim's net
economic loss within a specific period of time, regardless of fault. 9 Eco-
nomic loss would include medical expenses and lost wages above the
amounts available from the victim's own health and accident insurance or
sick leave granted by the employer.20 Thus, in this elective system, the prov-
iders agree to be bound to pay net economic loss and give victims the option
to accept the tender or pursue their claims in court.
Legislation embodying some of the ideas of the O'Connell statutory plan
was introduced in the 98th Congress, although it did not succeed in winning
16. Id. at 82.
17. Jeffrey O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault Liability Statute, 628 INS. L.J. 261, 264
(1975).
18. Id. at 267-90.
19. Jeffrey O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees
of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CAL. L. REV. 898, 907 (1985).
20. Id.
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sufficient support.2" Basically, the bill would have permitted health care
providers to make a commitment to compensate injured patients in exchange
for relinquishing their right to sue for noneconomic damages. Patients
would be entitled to full reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses, includ-
ing wages, medical costs less any payment from third parties, and treatment
for pain. Because compensation would be on a periodic basis as losses ac-
crued, health care providers would not know the extent of their liability at
the time of making the commitment to pay.
BRITISH PROPOSALS
Both the Royal College of Physicians and the British Medical Association
(BMA) have recently advocated a form of no fault compensation. Although
the full reports are not yet available, it has been suggested that the Royal
College has proposed reparations for economic loss with a limitation on lost
earnings and has included some noneconomic damages as well.22 According
to these proposals, plaintiffs must forego a negligence action if they choose
no fault compensation.
The BMA reprinted a study of 19 district health authorities covering al-
most 300 claims in 1988.23 Of these claims, forty-five percent were ineligible
for compensation, thirty-six percent suffered minor injury and no lost in-
come, seven percent experienced loss of earnings for a certain period of disa-
bility and thirteen percent were permanently disabled or died leaving
dependents.24 The BMA's proposal consisted of three levels of compensa-
tion: 1) 500 to 5,000 pounds when there is no lasting disability; 2) 1000
pounds to 25,000 pounds if a person experiences not only pain, but a loss of
wages, and 3) up to 10,000 pounds each year for a person who requires con-
tinuous support, such as a brain damaged baby.25 The BMA also proposed a
separate emergency fund to compensate special cases, such as hemophiliacs
afflicted with AIDS as a consequence of blood transfusions. 26 The BMA
21. For a legal commentary on the proposed bill, see W. Henson Moore & John S. Hoff,
H.R. 3084: A More Rational Compensation System for Medical Malpractice, 49 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 117 (1986). Similarly, the 102d Congress proposed a system of alternative dis-
pute resolution for medical injury claims whereby recovery is limited to economic loss. See
H.R. 1004, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
22. David Bolt, Compensating for Medical Mishaps: A Model "No Fault" Scheme, NEW
L.J., Jan. 27, 1989, at 109, 109-10.
23. Support for No Fault Liability, World Insurance Report, Jan. 18, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Banking Library, FINTIME File.
24. Id.
25. BMA Puts Cost on "No Fault" Compensation, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 11, 1991,
at 4.
26. Liz Hunt, No Fault Medical Plan "Would Cost § 100m," THE INDEPENDENT, Jan.
11, 1991, at 6.
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estimated that this compensation scheme would cost more than 100 million
27pounds per year.
Among the factors motivating British physicians to initiate a no fault pro-
posal were the high costs associated with the current system of litigation and
compensation, the long delays in recovery, and the failure to restore many
who are physically injured, while excessively compensating others. After es-
timating that expenditures on legal and administrative fees consume seventy
percent of a patient's award, the report concluded that the present system is
unfair to patients.28
THE NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY ACT
The first national no fault reparation system approved by Congress is the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 198629 (The Vaccine Act) cover-
ing injury or death due to the administration of compulsory childhood vac-
cinations. The impetus for such legislation came from a number of sources,
including parents' organizations, vaccine manufacturers, and public health
authorities.30 In fact, some vaccine manufacturers had withdrawn their
products from the market because of liability exposure and the difficulty in
maintaining adequate insurance. At the same time, public health authorities
sought to maintain the availability of certain vaccines despite the unavoida-
ble risk of adverse effects.
The Vaccine Act established the Office of Special Masters to resolve injury
claims without requiring formal judicial action against the vaccine manufac-
turer." The proceedings are comparatively informal. The claimant must
prove cause-in-fact, or "a logical sequence of cause and effect." It is not
necessary to establish fault on the part of the manufacturer. Compensation
awarded under the Vaccine Act includes past and future expenses, loss of
earnings, and pain and suffering.32
Commentators have applauded the Vaccine Act's procedure,33 as well as
its fair and efficient results, and urged its adoption as a model of tort reform.
This program operates in a well-defined, highly specialized area where caus-
27. Id.
28. BMA Puts Cost on "No Fault" Compensation, supra note 25, at 4.
29. 42 U S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (1988).
30. Denis J. Hauptly & Mary Mason, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act: The
Federal No-Fault Compensation Program That Gives a Booster for Tort Reform, 37 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 452, 452 (1990).
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-12(c), (d) (West 1991).
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(a)-(c) (West 1991).
33. See, e.g., Sarah Glazer, Vaccine Victims: No-Fault Federal Program Compensates for
Injuries, WASH. PosT, Jan. 29, 1991, Health Magazine, at 9 (quoting Michael Hugo, Chairman
of the Vaccine Litigation Group for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America).
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ally related, adverse outcomes can be more easily identified. Nonetheless, it
is more than simply a practical response to medical injury. As a matter of
public policy, societal duty, and moral responsibility, a community should
assist persons who are severely impaired through no act of their own as di-
rectly, expeditiously, and fully as is reasonably possible.
COMPENSATION FOR BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURIES
For reasons similar to Congress' objectives in passing the Vaccine Act,
several states have recently enacted laws providing no fault reparations for
birth-related neurological damage.34 This type of legislation is necessary be-
cause life time care of a neurologically impaired infant, whether or not
caused by the negligence of an obstetrician, involves an economic burden
beyond the financial means of the average family. Furthermore, it is well
known that obstetricians' malpractice premiums have climbed to extraordi-
nary heights; to pay $100,000 a year is not uncommon. As a consequence,
shortages of obstetricians have developed in some states. State officials re-
sponsible for maintaining necessary health services in those states cannot
ignore this trend.
The compensation provided by these acts is limited to actual medical ex-
penses, a percentage of estimated lost earnings, and attorney's fees, all of
which are paid on a periodic basis." There is no award for pain and suffer-
ing. An administrative agency reviews the evidence and determines the va-
lidity of the claim and the appropriate amount of reparations.3 6 Ultimately,
there is the possibility of judicial review.
Funding for the compensation plan is based on assessments of physicians
and hospitals. For example, obstetricians who wish to participate in the plan
are assessed $5000 per year;37 hospitals are assessed $50 for each live birth.3"
Additionally, all physicians licensed in the state are assessed $250 per year.39
This mandatory payment by all physicians has aroused opposition and is
being challenged as unconstitutional.4°
34. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.301-.316 (West Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1991). For a thorough review of the Virginia
Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program, see David G. Duff, Compensation
for Neurologically Impaired Infants: Medical No-Fault in Virginia, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 391
(1990).
35. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009 (Michie 1990).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5008 (Michie 1990).
37. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.314(4)(c) (West Supp. 1991).
38. See id. § 766.314(4)(a).
39. See id. § 766.314(4)(b)1.
40. See McGibony v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, 564
So. 2d 177, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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These legislative initiatives recognize the public's responsibility in provid-
ing economic assistance in cases of a particular kind of injury. The sense of
ethical or moral duty to ease the catastrophic impact upon innocent victims
is a beginning. Legislative bodies have not yet exhibited sufficient fortitude
and resolve to create a system of universal health care paid for by a broad
tax program. Nonetheless, the economic sustenance provided in cases of
disastrous injuries or illnesses without proof of fault reveals some redeeming
moral impulses.
CONCLUSION
Addressing the consequences of employment and motor vehicle related
injuries has assumed some semblance of a public responsibility. A strict lia-
bility system of compensation is in effect for employment related injuries in
all states, and a substantial number of states currently compensate motor
vehicle related injuries. The rationale for these systems encompasses not
only a public desire to avoid litigation costs and health care expenses, but
also a concern for the personal welfare of injured individuals and their fam-
ily. Additionally, the growing dissatisfaction with the uncertainty and irra-
tionality of a tort remedy has fostered this public repsonsibility.
At least since the mid-1960s and the landmark works of Professors Con-
ard, O'Connell, and Keeton, as well as other legal scholars, critics have ex-
posed the real costs, abuses, and basic inequities of consigning injured
persons to the traditional tort treadmill. The tort system has undergone nu-
merous modifications during the past decade including caps on awards, ab-
rogation of the collateral source rule, and periodic payments, among
others.41 While some modifications may have observable effects on the fre-
quency and size of malpractice claims, none is adequate to achieve major
improvements in providing an ethical approach to necessary compensation.
The optimal system appears to be a pure type A mechanism based on
social insurance. However, because this is not a realistic possibility in the
United States at this time, a type B form which limits net economic loss
recovery is the most fair, efficient, and politically palatable mechanism. Pain
and suffering damages can rarely be justified on the basis of an accurate
computation. Indeed, they have been characterized as irrational, illogical,
the reservoir from which the attorneys will claim their fee, a generous and
vicarious outpouring of jury sympathy, and the primary justification for in-
surers to charge high premiums.
A system with a net economic loss basis providing reasonable resources
41. See Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims:
New Evidence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 76-78 (1986).
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for an injured person to be treated, rehabilitated, and able to sustain depen-
dents despite lost earnings, could gain public acceptance. Designing such a
system is not an impossibility. Administrative boards or panels composed of
three health care professionals, a health economist, a representative of social
service agencies, and a member of both the legislative and executive
branches could hear and decide medical injury claims both as to merit and
compensation. Furthermore, judicial review may be provided after exhaust-
ing administrative remedies.
The problem of causation42 is an inhibiting factor in proposed no fault
plans. It is difficult to penetrate a presenting illness plus treatment-a com-
posite condition-in order to expose the true factual cause of the asserted
injury and, therefore, one must anticipate that guidelines and principles will
be developed by the appropriate administrative agency. In that case, the
experience of the health professionals who serve on the panel of the adminis-
trative agency will be persuasive.
Beyond cause in fact, however, the real issue is proximate cause and the
extent to which resources permit or the moral sensitivity of the public insists
that medical injury or illness be compensated. More than sixty years ago,
Judge Andrews in his dissent in the famous Palsgraf case remarked, "What
we do mean by the word 'proximate' is that, because of convenience, of pub-
lic policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a
series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical
politics."43
42. For a variety of approaches to the theory of causation, see H.L.A. HART & TONY
HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985); Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in
Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982); Richard W. Wright,
Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof- Pruning the Bramble
Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001 (1988).
43. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1926) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
